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The Social Effects of Psychism: Spiritual Experience and the 
Construction of Privatized Religion 
 
What is the relationship between spiritual experiences and privatized religion? This study defines 
spiritual experiences in terms of “psychism,” or psychic intrusions in the stream of consciousness 
that are not perceived by the actor as originating within the “self.” Intrusions interpreted as 
psychism are regarded by the actor as having the same facticity as empirical experience and are 
regarded as “proof” of an esoteric belief system. Psychism originated beliefs are therefore 
resistant to refutation or change, and support spiritual autonomy. Psychism theory is tested using 
1988 GSS data on religious beliefs, where psychism is measured using GSS questions on 
“paranormal” experiences. Nonrecursive models demonstrate that psychism is a cause (not 
effect), has a negative effect on conformist beliefs and communal practices and a positive effect 
on moral autonomy and private religious practices, and that it has a nuanced effect on beliefs 
regarding God. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Paranormal and spiritual experiences are one of the perennial mysteries of human behavior: 
Why do rational people embrace supernatural explanations? How do paranormal and religious 
experiences relate to each other? Are they the result of religious conformity or a cause for moral 
autonomy? To get some data on the phenomenon, the General Social Survey included a series of 
questions in the 1980s which asked for the frequency of instances of telepathy, clairvoyance, 
communication with the dead, and mystical experiences. The results showed a remarkably high 
incidence across the population: more than 75 percent of the population report having at least 
one psychism experience, and almost 15 percent experience at least one of the four types often..1 
However, a century after James (1994) called for a scientific study of religious experience, 
science has yet to develop a clear understanding of the phenomenon. We have a variety of 
measures – the Greeley and McCready (1974) scale used in the GSS, the Spiritual Experience 
Questionnaire (Jackson, 1997), the Index of Core Spiritual Experiences (Kass et al, 1991), the 
Mysticism Scale (Hood, 1975), and the Spiritual Experience Index (Genia, 1991) – but none 
have a clear theoretical foundation which explains it and its place in a causal chain.  
This study proposes a unified conception of “psychism” in which paranormal and spiritual 
experiences are understood as “mind glitches.” A person perceives psychism as intrusions of 
psychic objects within the stream of consciousness – though here I use the more standard 
psychological definition of “psychic” as relating to the human mind or psyche (e.g., thoughts, 
emotions, sensory input, or impulses). In this conception, people externalize or interpret intruded 
                     
1 This result is based on creating a measure that reflects the highest level of any of the four 
items.  
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objects as originating in or operating through a spirit realm, and then interpret them as implying 
or conveying beliefs which, because of their perceived origin, they privilege over socially 
validated beliefs. One consequence is that when people confront resistance from social networks 
over psychism-constructed beliefs, they maintain their own interpretations at the expense of 
these networks.  
I test this theory using GSS data in nonrecursive models that simultaneously estimate both 
paths of influence between psychism and religious beliefs and practices. The results demonstrate 
that, contrary to popular conception, spiritual experiences are not the consequence of religious 
identity or conformity, but instead lead to privatized religion. 
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS OF ALTERED STATES 
Science has confronted an onslaught of claims of paranormal and spiritual experiences since 
the last decades of the nineteenth century. Beleaguered churches, the Spiritualist movement, 
esoteric organizations, and travelers from colonized lands generated so many claims of 
divination, spirit possession or communication, and extrasensory perception that many European 
and American intellectuals created the Society for Psychical Research to investigate them (see 
Webb, 1974; Inglis, 1977; and Aventi, 1996), though it had mixed success. Responses from the 
scientific establishment can be seen in the classical writings of psychology and sociology. James 
(1994:258) described spiritual experiences in terms of “‘uprushes’ into ordinary consciousness of 
energies originating in the subliminal parts of the mind”, but ascribed the most extreme 
manifestations to “nervous instability” (1994:276). Freud dismissed spiritual experiences (along 
with religion itself) as manifestations of the “omnipotence of thought” reported by “obsessional 
neurotics” (1950:107; see also 1961a:35), as “projections of …emotional impulses” (1950:115), 
and as pathologies involving the “ego boundary” (1961b:13). Durkheim (1965:464) alluded to 
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spiritual experiences as a means by which practitioners “set free energies superior to those which 
we ordinarily have at our command,” resulting in “experimental proof of … beliefs.”  
Subsequent psychological and sociological explanations have developed along with their 
respective disciplines. Malony and Lovekin’s (1985) study of Pentecostals speaking in tongues 
(glossolalia) offers an extensive review of psychological theories that includes hysteria, 
suggestibility or susceptibility to influence from leaders, “psychic contagion,” and conformity. 
To this, recent psychological research has added the influence of religious roles on the perceptual 
cycle (Wikstrom, 1987; Van Der Lans, 1987), the emergence of repressed superego (Edwards 
and Lowis, 2001), psychophysiological process such as endorphin responses (Prince, 1982), 
responses to rhythms (Neher, 1962; Rouget, 1985), and various versions of temporal lobe 
discharges (Persinger, 1983, 1993; Winkelman, 1986; Persinger, et. al. 1994; Philipchalk and 
Mueller, 2000). The most recent additions focus on schizotypal personality disorder, a boundary 
condition of schizophrenia that includes “magical thinking” and “unusual perceptual 
experiences.” This literature (see the edited collection by Raine, Lencz, and Mednick, 1995; and 
Claridge, 1997) generally characterizes these experiences in terms analogous to hardware or 
software glitches in the brain. However, while these theories at least offer a conceptualization of 
the experience, they are subject to Durkheim’s criticism that they presume that the phenomenon 
in question begins with “psychical states” independently of social contexts (1982:131), and 
“whose expression alone, because it is external, assumes social form” (1982:205). 
Sociological explanations, by contrast, focus on how social influences generate claims of 
paranormal and spiritual experiences. These include social stress from conformity or deprivation 
from devalued social position (Glock and Stark, 1965; Greeley, 1974; Stark and Bainbridge, 
1980 and 1987; Wuthnow, 1981), reactions to social change (Tiryakian, 1974; Webb, 1974; Ben-
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Yahuda, 1985), or a “breakdown of modernization” (Eisenstadt, 1970). Many theorists assume 
substitution theory religious and secular paranormal experiences are related as functional 
equivalents and substitutes for each other (for a review see Orenstein, 2002). More recent studies 
have disconfirmed deprivation theory (Fox, 1992), cast doubt on the “substitution” theory for 
religious and paranormal beliefs (Orenstein, 2002; McKinnon, 2003), abandoned 
characterizations of claimants as “crazy or crooked” (Stark, 1999), and advanced a view of 
spiritual experiences as a product of specialized discourse and interpretation (Jorgensen, 1984; 
Luhrmann, 1989), as manifestations of creative genius (Stark, 1999), or as a “populist” 
interpretation of experiences using “commonsense,” comforting, or even entertaining 
explanations (Goode, 2000).  
These explanations can best be critiqued by deconstructing an “experience” into its 
components of (1) socialization, (2) awareness, (3) interpretation, and (4) response (see Laubach, 
2004). While psychological models overemphasize how nonempirical perceptions emerge into 
awareness, sociological models ignore that to focus on socialization, interpretation, and response, 
and ultimately lose the distinction between having and reporting an experience. In addition, these 
models tend to view spiritual experiences as outcomes, with its only predicted effects as 
intensifying evangelism (Poloma and Pendleton, 1989), improving mental or physical health 
(Kass, et al, 1991; Lindgren and Coursey, 1995; Jackson, 1997; Fallot, 2001), and reinforcing the 
beliefs and commitment to the organization that created them (Howell, 1997; Tumminia, 2002). 
This last effect is widely assumed but not tested across the broadest spectrum of society.  
A THEORY OF PSYCHISM 
The proposed reconceptualization unifies all components of the “experience” and suggests 
very different social consequences. It was developed from an ethnophenomenological study of 
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Neopagan possession trance in which participants reconstructed a moment-by-moment 
description of their perceptions during the experience (Laubach, 2004). Extrapolating from those 
descriptions, the underlying phenomenon of paranormal and spiritual experiences is defined as 
“psychism”: perceptions of psychic intrusions into the stream of consciousness that are 
interpreted by the actor as not originating within the self’s normal information channels. These 
“intrusions” can be seen as examples of Schutz’s (1973:228) discussion of a break in the epoché 
of the natural attitude by an event which offers a “special motivation, such as the irruption of a 
‘strange’ experience not subsumable under the stock of knowledge at hand or inconsistent with 
it, … [that makes] us revise our former beliefs.”  
Psychism theory proposes that psychic intrusions are relatively normal occurrences (e.g., déjà 
vu, hearing your name called when nobody is around, “seeing things”), but most are ignored 
because the requirements for living in modern rationalized society puts constraints on people’s 
attention that these intrusions must be ignored. Psychic intrusions “become” psychism when a 
person interprets them as originating externally, thus invoking some paranormal realm or 
process. This interpretation differentiates between intrusion types, as can be seen in Fox’s (1992) 
analysis of GSS data where déjà vu did not factor together with the “paranormal experiences.” 
Defining spiritual or paranormal experiences at the level of the stream of consciousness 
assumes that people give meaningful interpretations to all psychic objects that emerge into 
attention using elements of the person’s culture (see Schutz, 1967). However, as Tiryakian 
(1974:264) noted, western societies have competing subcultures: an exoteric subculture based in 
empiricism that offers the “cognitive and evaluative orientations publicly recognized and 
legitimated in the network of social institutions,” and an esoteric subculture based in 
“religiophilosophical belief systems” that asserts that “the familiar, everyday world is contingent 
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on the operations of a knowable but hidden reality, one not accessible to the senses” (1974:3). 
While a psychic object not originating from sensory input, cognitive, or affective processes 
might not be satisfactorily interpreted using exoteric culture, the ubiquity of esoteric or occult 
subculture makes it likely that some interpretation will be available, regardless of the person’s 
beliefs prior to the experience. Furthermore, because these intrusions emerge into the stream of 
consciousness in the same way as any other psychic object, psychism theory proposes that they 
are initially perceived as having the same “reality value” as empirically derived objects.2 
However, their final determination as “real” is a decision made by the perceiver based on identity 
commitments – i.e., the person’s relative commitments to social networks that hold exoteric vs. 
esoteric beliefs (see Stryker, 1987:90). Ultimately, people use the experience to justify adopting 
a new belief system if the intrusions are intense enough, the interpretations are plausible enough, 
and the identity commitments are either weak enough to be abandoned or are strong enough to 
survive a change.  
Once a person interprets intrusions to be communication from “higher” spiritual powers, a 
new identity commitment is established that supercedes weaker commitments to empirical-world 
social relations, and the beliefs derived from intrusions take on a privileged status. As 
discrepancies develop between the psychism-originated beliefs and beliefs held by the person’s 
social networks, he or she is more likely to maintain the privileged beliefs, creating tensions that 
require increasingly greater flexibility from other members of the network. The consequence for 
religious networks, which are generally based on the maintenance of relatively fixed beliefs, is 
                     
2  Durkheim (1965:465) acknowledged this similarity when he noted that “religious beliefs rest 
on a specific experience whose demonstrative value is… not one bit inferior from that of 
scientific experiments, though different from them.”  
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that people who experience high levels of psychism should be more likely to affirm their 
autonomy than to conform to the beliefs held by the network. Ultimately, because moral 
autonomy is not compatible with commitment to religious organizations, people who experience 
high levels of psychism should also have lower levels of participation in communal religious 
practices. The ultimate result is that they develop their own privatized religion.  
If psychism has an adverse effect on conformity, we might conclude that religions should be 
reluctant to endorse practices that use it. However, Howell (1997) noted that religions influence 
the experience and the resulting beliefs, making psychism an excellent commitment tool. While 
this influence was apparent in the new religious movement that Howell studied, it should be 
clearly identifiable in the pervasive commitment-oriented practices of churches that practice 
glossolalia and other psychism-based gifts of the spirit (see Malony and Lovekin, 1985; Poloma 
and Pendleton, 1989). Conformist practices should therefore be seen as a means of keeping the 
effects of psychism working for the sponsoring religion instead of promoting heresy. For this 
reason, conformity should be found together with psychism-based practices in religions, but the 
causal influence is easily misinterpreted by analysts, especially if the population being observed 
is only experiencing psychism in religiously approved conditions. The real effects should only be 
apparent if the population being studied is broad enough to include unsponsored experiences and 
if the effects of conformity-enforcing organizations are statistically controlled. 
Competing Theories 
Psychism theory’s consequences are very different from those predicted by the conventional 
conformity-based theory of spiritual experiences and substitution theory (see Orenstein, 2002) 
that paranormal beliefs are substitutes religious beliefs. This study uses these differences to 
develop a series of hypotheses to test all three. Each theory addresses the relationship between 
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spiritual experiences and six specific target religious beliefs and practices: (1) religious identity, 
(2) social interaction with God, (3) religious conformity, (4) communal religious practices, (5) 
moral autonomy, and (6) private religious practices. In the section below, I outline each of three 
theories and provide hypotheses consistent with each theory’s predictions. 
A. Conformity Theory. Much of conventional theory about religious experience draws implicitly 
on the power of social conformity to elicit false claims (Sherif, 1935; Asch, 1951), to engage in 
behaviors not acceptable to the normal self (Milgram, 1963 & 1964; Haney et al., 1973), and to 
ignore disconfirming beliefs (Festinger et al, 1956). Conformity theory would predict a 
reciprocal relationship between spiritual experience and religious beliefs in that spiritual 
experiences are seen as both the result of strong religious identities (see Wikstrom, 1987; Van 
Der Lans, 1987) and as evidence by the believer to reinforce those beliefs. This relationship 
should hold both for beliefs that define religious identity and beliefs that suggest a personal 
relationship or interaction with God. Next, greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect conformity 
should result in higher frequencies of spiritual experiences. Similarly, since conformity over an 
extended period reflects a high level of commitment to a social network, conformity theory 
would predict that higher participation in communal practices should result in greater frequencies 
of spiritual experiences. Reciprocally, conformity theory predicts that spiritual experiences in 
turn reinforce conformist beliefs and practices. On the other hand, beliefs in moral autonomy 
should undermine the conformity necessary to support nonempirical claims, and therefore should 
result in lower frequencies of spiritual experiences. Reciprocally, by reinforcing conformity, 
spiritual experiences should undermine moral autonomy. Finally, conformity theory would 
predict that private practices reflect an internalization of communal practices and would have the 
same effect mutually reinforcing relationship with spiritual experiences.  
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These predictions can be conveyed as hypotheses that specify the following relationships 
between the six target beliefs and practices and the occurrence of psychism: 
Hypothesis 1a: Net of other social influences, intensified beliefs that reflect religious identity will 
result in higher frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher frequencies of psychism will result 
in intensified beliefs that reflect religious identity. 
Hypothesis 2a: Net of other social influences, intensified beliefs indicating a social interaction 
with God will result in higher frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher frequencies of 
psychism will result in intensified beliefs indicating a social interaction with God. 
Hypothesis 3a: Net of other social influences, greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect 
conformity will result in higher frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher frequencies of 
psychism will result in greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect conformity. 
Hypothesis 4a: Net of other social influences, higher participation in communal practices will 
result in higher frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher frequencies of psychism will result 
in higher participation in communal practices. 
Hypothesis 5a: Net of other social influences, greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect moral 
autonomy will result in lower frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher frequencies of 
psychism will result in lower acceptance of beliefs that reflect moral autonomy. 
Hypothesis 6a: Net of other social influences, higher rates of engagement in religious practices 
that are conducted privately will result in higher frequencies of psychism. Reciprocally, higher 
frequencies of psychism will result in higher rates of engagement in religious practices that are 
conducted privately.  
B. Substitution Theory. Substitution theory asserts that “the paranormal beliefs have become a 
substitute for (or a functional alternative to) mainstream religion” (Orenstein, 2002:309), 
predicting that the presence of religious beliefs and practices will result in the absence of 
paranormal beliefs. Orenstein tested this by regressing paranormal beliefs on religious beliefs 
and attendance and concluded that while “some amount of religious belief is a necessary 
condition for paranormal belief, …something specific about religious attendance or participation 
reduces belief in the paranormal.” These conclusions are retested here, using different measures 
of religious beliefs and practices, claims of paranormal experience (psychism) instead of just 
belief in the paranormal, and models that test instead of assert the direction of influence. The 
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following hypotheses are essentially the opposite of conformity theory, except that substitution 
theory offers no prediction for the effect of moral autonomy on psychism. 
Hypothesis 1b: Net of other social influences, intensified beliefs that reflect religious identity will 
result in lower frequencies of psychism.  
Hypothesis 2b: Net of other social influences, intensified beliefs indicating a social interaction 
with God will result in lower frequencies of psychism.  
Hypothesis 3b: Net of other social influences, greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect 
conformity will result in lower frequencies of psychism.. 
Hypothesis 4b: Net of other social influences, higher participation in communal practices will 
result in lower frequencies of psychism. 
Hypothesis 5b: no prediction of the relationship between moral autonomy and psychism 
Hypothesis 6b: Net of other social influences, higher rates of engagement in religious practices 
that are conducted privately will result in lower frequencies of psychism.  
C. Psychism Theory. The theory of psychism developed in this paper maintains that while a 
psychism experience can be interpreted in religious terms, a strong religious identity would not 
necessarily promote nor inhibit an interpretation of psychic intrusions as external – i.e., 
psychism. In addition, a social statement such as a religious identity (i.e., faith) is more 
dependent on socialization and community than a personal experience such as psychism, 
regardless of psychism’s inherently social interpretation. Psychism theory therefore predicts that 
there will be no effects between psychism and religious identity beliefs. On the other hand, 
beliefs that reflect an interaction or personal relationship with God are more complex and emerge 
from repeated experiences which evoke the reflexivity that characterizes an interaction with 
other (e.g. Mead, 1967; Stryker, 1980). Psychism theory therefore predicts that psychism 
intensifies such beliefs. Also, as discussed earlier, psychism theory predicts that psychism 
reduces conformist beliefs and communal practices, and increases moral autonomy. Furthermore, 
psychism theory predicts that psychism encourages religious practices that are consistent with 
Page 12 
what I term “privatized,” that is practices that can be conducted without concern for conforming 
to someone else’s interpretations of the experience. In hypothesis form: 
Hypothesis 1c: Psychism will have no effect on beliefs that reflect religious identity . 
Hypothesis 2c: Net of other social influences, higher reported frequencies of psychism will result 
in intensified beliefs indicating a social interaction with God. 
Hypothesis 3c: Net of other social influences, higher frequencies of psychism will result in 
rejection of beliefs that reflect conformity. 
Hypothesis 4c: Net of other social influences, higher frequencies of psychism will result in lower 
levels of participation in communal practices. 
Hypothesis 5c: Net of other social influences, higher frequencies of psychism will result in 
greater acceptance of beliefs that reflect moral autonomy. 
Hypothesis 6c: Net of other social influences, higher frequencies of psychism will result in 
higher rates of engagement in religious practices that are conducted privately. 
The competing hypotheses of conformity theory, substitution theory, and psychism theory 
are summarized in Table 1. The next section attempts to adjudicate the differences among these 
three competing explanations. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
METHODS AND DATA 
The data for this study are drawn from the 1988 General Social Survey (GSS), a large 
national survey of American noninstitutionalized adults that has been conducted since 1972. 
Details for all variables are used in the analysis are shown in Appendix A.  
Table 2 shows distributions for the four questions ESP, VISIONS, SPIRITS, and GRACE 
used in the psychism scale. These questions, asked by the GSS in 1984, 1988, and 1989 were 
originally developed by Greeley and McCready (1974) to measure mysticism. These were asked 
along with DEJAVU, and all five can be recognized as psychic intrusions in the stream of 
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consciousness. However, the first four meet the definition of psychism because they are 
interpreted as originating externally, with implications that contradict the exoteric belief system 
– i.e. something more than the mind “glitch” that is the popular interpretation of déjà vu. Fox 
(1992) empirically confirmed this distinction when he was able to fit the data to a model with a 
single factor (which he titled “paranormal experience”) underlying the first four questions only 
after he excluded déjà vu.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Panel A of Table 2 reports frequencies over the three years of data collection for the four 
psychism questions. However, since each form of psychism represented in the questions has the 
same implication for undermining the exoteric belief system and privileging psychism-originated 
beliefs, Panel B offers an alternative format, reporting the highest frequencies a person would 
report for any of the four items. It shows that overall, more than three-quarters (75.5 percent) of 
the population report having at least one psychism experience, and almost 15 percent experience 
at least one of the four types often.  
This study extends Fox (1992) in several respects. First, where Fox used a subset of the 1984 
survey, this study uses data from the 1988 survey which includes a module on religious beliefs 
and practices. Secondly, this study avoids the large N problem Fox faced with his measurement 
model by using a composite scale for the psychism factor instead of a measurement model. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The third and most important difference is that this study uses a nonrecursive model to 
simultaneously estimate effects for both sides of the loop between psychism and the target belief 
or practice. Figure 1 depicts this model, with the term “target” representing the belief or practice 
being tested. Nonrecursive models require that instrumental variables be identified for both 
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dependent variables in the loop, with the criteria that the instruments are strongly correlated with 
one dependent variable in the loop and have no theorized effect on the other (see Heise, 
1975:160). The instrument used in this study for psychism is déjà vu, which is correlated with 
psychism as a type of intrusion but is not correlated with religious beliefs or practices because it 
is not interpreted as having religious meaning. The instrument for target religious beliefs and 
practices is orthodoxy, as measured by Biblical literalism (see Hunter, 1991), which itself should 
not affect psychism. Readers who are interested in a fuller discussion of the details of the 
nonrecursive modeling procedures should see Appendix B.  
Results 
The following section summarizes the findings regarding the nonrecursive relationship 
between psychism and the six target beliefs and practices. The key results of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 3, which shows only the standardized coefficients for the two paths that are 
relevant to the hypotheses being tested: t. for the effect of psychism on the target, and t 
for the effect of the target on psychism. Readers who are interested in a discussion of the full 
analysis are referred to Appendix C. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Religious identity beliefs. Neither path between psychism and the religious identity belief scale 
reaches statistical significance at the p<.05 level for a one tailed test, so the data offer no support 
for either hypotheses 1a or 1b, derived respectively from conformity and substitution theories, 
but does support 1c, derived from psychism theory.  
Social Interaction with God. Two questions that measure the respondent’s perception of a social 
interaction with God are closeness to God and anger at God. While the use of the first question 
is obvious, the phrasing of the second question reflects a more personal relationship than if it 
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were phrased in terms of an impersonal satisfaction or happiness with God. Again, neither path 
from closeness or anger to psychism was significant indicating no support for conformity 
theory’s hypothesis 2a and substitution theory’s hypothesis 2b. However, as predicted by 
psychism and partially by conformity theories, higher frequencies of psychism increase the 
perceived intensity of the belief, both in closeness (t = .23) and anger (t= .16), offering 
strong support for hypothesis 2c. In addition, psychism was the second strongest determinant for 
both beliefs, only slightly behind orthodoxy (orthodoxycloseness = .25) for closeness to God and 
equal in magnitude to age (agecloseness = -.16) for being angry with God. (See Appendix C). 
Religious Conformity Beliefs. The results support psychism theory’s hypothesis 3c that 
psychism reduces conformity (t = -.26). They disconfirm conformity theory’s hypothesis 3a 
that spiritual experiences increase conformity and offer no support for conformity theory’s 
prediction that conformity causes spiritual experiences or for substitution theory’s prediction in 
hypothesis 3b that paranormal experiences substitute for religious conformity (t = -.03). Once 
again, psychism has the strongest effect on conformity except for orthodoxy (orthodoxyconformity = 
.35). One final point is that the correlation between error terms for psychism and conformity is 
significant (()-(t)= .38), indicating that some influence outside the model is affecting both.  
Communal Religious Practices. Again, the results support psychism theory’s hypothesis 4c that 
psychism reduces communal practices (t = -.29). They also disconfirm conformity theory’s 
hypothesis 4a that psychism reinforces communal practices and offer no support for its 
prediction that participation in communal practices increase the frequency of spiritual 
experiences or for substitution theory’s prediction in hypothesis 4b that paranormal experiences 
substitute for communal religious practices (t= -.03). In this model, increasing levels of 
psychism are the strongest determinant against communal religious practices, even more so than 
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orthodoxy (orthodoxyconformity = .21) and having no religion at all (no religioncommunal= -.25). Again, 
the correlation between the error terms for communal practices and psychism is significant (()-
(t)= .35), indicating that some influence outside the model is affecting both. 
Moral Autonomy Beliefs. Two questions that measure moral autonomy are following one’s own 
conscience and morality as a personal matter. As predicted by psychism theory’s hypothesis 5c, 
higher reported levels of psychism increases both following one’s own conscience  (t = .22) 
and morality as a personal matter (t= .15), disconfirming conformity theory’s hypothesis 5a 
that spiritual experiences would reduce moral autonomy. In addition, neither measure of 
autonomy has a statistically significant effect on psychism at the p < .05 level, offering no 
support for hypothesis 5a that moral autonomy reduces the frequency of spiritual experiences. It 
should also be noted that the effect of psychism relative to the other determinants reaches its 
height on questions of moral autonomy, where it is more than twice the magnitude of any other 
factor on following one’s conscience and half again the magnitude of orthodoxy on morality as a 
personal matter (orthodoxypersonal = -.09). 
Private Religious Practices. The results support psychism theory’s hypothesis 6c that psychism 
increases the frequency of private spiritual practices (t = .16), but offer no support for 
conformity theory’s reciprocal effect in hypothesis 6a that private spiritual practices increase the 
frequency of spiritual experiences or substitution theory’s hypothesis 6b that private religious 
practices would reduce paranormal beliefs such as psychism (t= -.05).   
CONCLUSIONS    
Conformity, substitution, and psychism theories offer competing hypotheses for the effects 
between spiritual experience and religious beliefs and practices. The 1988 GSS data allow these 
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hypotheses to be tested using nonrecursive models which simultaneously estimate both paths 
between the frequencies of psychic experiences and measures of the intensity of religious beliefs 
and practices. This simultaneous estimation procedure is generally considered one means of 
determining the direction of causal influence; however, it should be noted that these data are 
cross-sectional and that perhaps longitudinal data would permit more definitive tests of causality. 
Nevertheless, these results offer strong support for psychism theory and no support or actual 
disconfirmation for conformity-based theories and substitution theory. They can also be seen as 
stronger tests of substitution theory than Orenstein’s study in that they distinguish between 
different types of religious beliefs and practices, use claims of paranormal experience instead of 
just beliefs, and test direction of influence instead of making it an assumption. 
Discussion 
The effects of psychism are subtle and difficult to find without both theoretical guidance and 
a broad enough sample to contrast both spontaneous experiences and experiences sponsored by 
religious organizations. This study uses a nationally representative sample (the 1988 GSS) and is 
guided by a definition of psychism as intrusions in the stream of consciousness that (1) convey 
information which is then (2) built into beliefs that are (3) accepted as supernaturally validated 
and privileged over beliefs that are validated through plausibility networks. The key findings are 
that spiritual experiences, for which psychism forms a basis, foster autonomy in moral beliefs 
and privatization of religious practices. This is a direct contradiction to the widely accepted 
conception that conformity is the mechanism through which people construct spiritual 
experiences and that people use spiritual experiences to reinforce religious identities.  
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These findings suggest that ethnographic studies that couple spiritual experiences with 
practices that intensify conformity and commitment are misinterpreting the causal link. Religious 
organizations, which recognize the inherently reinforcing nature of spiritual experiences, may 
also recognize and work against the possibility for developing and reinforcing heretical beliefs. 
This effort might be the outside influence on psychism and both conformity and communal 
practices that was indicated by the correlation between their error terms found in the models. 
However, other plausible explanations for this influence might include high levels of anxiety or 
low self-esteem that could increase instances of (or attention to) the psychic intrusions defined as 
psychism while also encouraging involvement in a religious community.  
Psychism theory as developed in this study is presented primarily as a corrective to more 
comprehensive theories of religion by offering a mechanism through which people have spiritual 
experiences and turn them into beliefs. However, while it is generally supportive of theories that 
emphasize the importance of spiritual experiences to religion, it does not necessarily suggest 
that, as Otto (1952:15) put it, spiritual experiences are “the basic factor and the basic impulse 
underlying the entire process of religious evolution.” On the other hand, psychism is clearly 
important to the development of religion. An intruded voice of a dead relative can be constructed 
into belief in an afterlife, and a disembodied voice calling your name can imply a spirit world 
populated by totems, gods, and demons. Once those beliefs become available in community 
discourse, additional psychism experiences and accounts of experiences reproduce them. As 
anthropomorphized images get projected onto a spirit world, so does the stratification that is 
readily apparent in the empirical world. When differences in psychism ability turn into control 
over access to the spirit world, the belief construction process gets appropriated by material 
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world interests and generates the organizations, dogma, alienation, false consciousness, and 
secularization long discussed by theorists of religion.  
Ultimately, while psychism theory has its most obvious impact on theories of religion, 
psychism is about social psychological processes and the construction of beliefs and should have 
observable effects beyond religion. Further research should explore a number of additional 
consequences. Psychism represents a breach of the symbolic interactionist principle that people 
construct and validate beliefs using social networks and should therefore entail consequences 
that take the form of alienation. Also, as a phenomenon that can be construed as a challenge to 
the rationalized, empirical belief system that underlies modern social institutions, psychism 
should have an observable effect undermining people’s perceptions of rationalized institutions. 
Finally, psychism offers a unique opportunity to study belief construction and dispersion, 
especially as people turn claims of an essentially private experience into publicly accepted 
beliefs. 
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Table 2. Panel A. Percentages by Year for General Social Survey Questions Relating to 
Psychic Experiences  
 ESP Extrasensory Perception  SPIRITS Spirit Contact 
 
felt as though you were in touch 
with someone when they were far 
away from you 
 felt you were in touch with someone 
who had died 
  84 88 89 Total  84 88 89  Total 
1  never in my life 33.4 35.2 41.8 36.2  57.7 60.1 64.4 60.3 
2  once or twice 28.6 35.4 30.1 31.5 23.3 24.2 23.0 23.6 
3  several times 28.6 21.5 21.4 24.1 13.8 10.1 8.3 11.0 
4  often 9.5 8.0 6.7 8.2 5.1 5.6 4.3 5.1 
total 1439 1456 992 3887 1445 1459 991 3895 
 
 VISIONS Clairvoyance  GRACE Mystical Experience 
 
seen events that happened at a 
distance as they were happening 
 felt as though you were very close 
to a powerful spiritual force that 
seemed to lift you out of yourself 
  84 88 89  Total  84 88 89  Total 
1  never in my life 70.4 71.7 76.7 72.5  59.4 68.5 70.3 65.6 
2  once or twice 17.7 17.2 14.3 16.7 20.4 18.3 17.6 18.9 
3  several times 9.2 7.6 6.8 8.0 13.7 8.6 7.5 10.2 
4  often 2.7 3.4 2.1 2.8 6.5 4.5 4.6 5.3 
Total 1434 1440 983 3857  1442 1451 988 3881 
 
 
Panel B.  Percentages by Year for Having Experienced Any of the 
Psychism Experiences Asked in the General Social Survey.   
  
All Intrusions 
(including déjà vu)  
Psychism 
only  
1  never in my life 13.5 24.5 
2  once or twice 27.9 31.4 
3  several times 40.1 29.3 
4  often 18.1 14.8 
Total 3892 3875 
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Table 3. Summary of Tests for Direction of Effects between Psychism and 
Religious Beliefs and Practices 
 Full Information Model 
Target Religious Beliefs and Practices 
Target to 
Psychism 
Psychism to 
Target 
Religious identity -0.03  0.00   
 (-0.29 ) (0.01 )  
Social interaction with God      
Perceived Closeness to God -0.04  0.23 ††  
 (-0.29 ) (3.01 )  
Anger at God 0.14  0.16 †  
 (0.30 ) (1.82 )  
      
Religious Conformity -0.03  -0.26 ††  
 (-0.29 ) (-3.37 )  
      
Communal Religious Practices -0.05  -0.29 ††  
 (-0.29 ) (-3.61 )  
Moral Autonomy      
Importance of Following Conscience 0.10  0.15 †  
 (0.30 ) (1.70 )  
Morality is a Personal Matter  0.09  0.22 ††  
 (0.30 ) (2.49 )  
      
Private Practices -0.04  0.15 †  
 (-0.29 ) (2.08 )  
† p<.05  †† p<.01  one-tailed tests   () denote t-scores  
 
Page 29 
Figure 1. Nonrecursive Model of Psychism and Target Beliefs and 
Practices.  
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Appendix A. Data Dictionary 
The data are drawn from the General Social Survey, for which additional information can be found at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS 
 
Dependent variable: The psychism scale is comprised of the following items: 
 All are derived from the question sequence: how often have you had any of the following experiences 
(1=never in my life, 2=once or twice, 3=several times, or 4=often) 
ESP felt as though you were in touch with someone when they were far away from you? 
VISIONS seen events that happened at a distance as they were happening? 
SPIRITS felt you were in touch with someone who had died? 
GRACE felt as though you were very close to a powerful spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of yourself? 
 
Target beliefs and practices: 
 
1. The religious identity scale is comprised of the following items: 
GOD  tell me which statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about God. 
1=I don't believe in God. 
2=I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out 
3=I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of some kind 
4=I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others 
5=While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God 
6=I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it 
MYFAITH  Where would you place your feelings about your faith? If you feel that "My faith is completely free of 
doubts," you would place yourself at 1. If you feel "My faith is mixed with doubts," you would place 
yourself at 7. If you feel somewhere between these two, you would place yourself at 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. 
(Values are reflected to make free of doubts high.) 
 
2. Social interaction with God scale is measured by the following items: 
NEARGOD  How close do you feel to God most of the time? (not close at all, not very close, somewhat close, 
extremely close) 
MADATGOD  Here is another card with contrasting ideas. If you feel that " I often feel angry at God," you would 
place yourself at 1. If you feel " I have never felt angry at God," you would place yourself at 7. If you 
feel somewhere between these two, you would place yourself at 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. (Values are reflected to 
make free of doubts high.) 
 
3. The religious conformity scale is comprised of the following items: 
BELIEVE  People have many differing views about what makes a person a good Christian or Jew. Please tell me 
how important is each of the following to you. Once again, please indicate where you would place 
your feelings on a scale from 1 to 5. How important is it: To believe in God without question or doubt. 
(Values are coded to make importance high.) 
DECBIBLE  Please indicate your answer by stating where you would place your feelings on a scale from 1 to 5 as 
shown on this hand card. Consider the first topic. If you think the teachings of your church or 
synagogue is very important in helping you to make decisions about your life, you would place 
yourself at 1. If you feel it is not very important in helping you to make decisions about your life, then 
you would place yourself at 5. If you feel the teachings of your church or synagogue is "somewhere 
between these two" in helping you make decisions about your life, then you would place yourself at 2, 
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3 or 4. (Values are recoded to make importance high.) 
FOLLOW  How important is it: To follow faithfully the teachings of their church or synagogue.  
 
4. The communal religious practices scale is comprised of the following items: 
ATTEND  How often do you attend religious services? (Never, Less than once a year, About once or twice a year, 
Several times a year, About once a month, 2-3 times a month, Nearly every week, Every week) 
TITHING  About how much do you contribute to your religion every year (not including school tuition)? 
CHURHMEM  Are you, yourself, a member of a church or synagogue? (Yes=1) 
 
5. Moral autonomy is measured by the following items: 
GOOWNWAY  How important is it: To follow one's conscience even if it means going against what the churches or 
synagogues say and do.  
PERMORAL  Please consider the following statements and tell me whether you disagree strongly, disagree 
somewhat, agree somewhat, or agree strongly with each statement: Morality is a personal matter and 
society should not force everyone to follow one standard.  
 
6. The private religious practices scale is comprised of the following items: 
READWORD  How often have you read the Bible in the last year? (Never, Less than once a week, Once a week, 
Several times a week, Once a day, Several times a day) 
PRAY  About how often do you pray? (Never, Less than once a week, Once a week, Several times a week, 
Once a day, Several times a day) 
 
Instruments 
DEJA VU how often have you thought you were somewhere you had been before, but knowing that it was 
impossible? (1=never in my life, 2=once or twice, 3=several times, or 4=often) 
ORTHODOX  Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?(1= The Bible is 
the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; 2=The Bible is the inspired word of 
God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; 3=The Bible is an ancient book 
of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by men) Values are reflected to make literal 
interpretation high 
 
Control variables: 
MARRIED  Recoded from: Are you currently--married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married? (Married =1, else=0) 
WIDOW  Recoded from: Are you currently--married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married? (Widowed =1, else=0) 
SEPARATE  Recoded from: Are you currently--married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married? (Separated =1, else=0) 
DIVORCED  Recoded from: Are you currently--married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been 
married? (Divorced =1, else=0) 
AGE  Computed from: What is your date of birth? 
EDUC  Based on questions: (1) What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you 
finished and got credit for? (2) Did you complete one or more years of college for credit--not including 
schooling such as business college, technical or vocational school? How many years did you 
complete? 
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INCOME  Combined family income from 1986 into 1982 categories by assuming individual values are 
distributed across category by sum of respondent and spouse (DOT) occupational prestige scores. 
Combined prestige are converted to z-scores, then capped at  2. This is divided by 2 and multiplied 
by ½ times the difference between the base and midpoint of each category. This result is multiplied by 
the ratio of the 1984 CPI to 1987 or 1989 depending on the year of the survey, then converted back 
into 1982 categories, which are: 
 1 'LT $1000' 7 '$7000-7999' 13 '$20000-22499' 
2 '$1000-2999' 8 '$8000-9999' 14 '$22500-24999' 
3 '$3000-3999' 9 '$10000-12499' 15 '$25000-34999' 
4 '$4000-4999' 10 '$12500-14999' 16 '$35000-49999' 
5 '$5000-5999' 11 '$15000-17499' 17 '50000+' 
6 '$6000-6999' 12 '$17500-19999'  
MALE  Recoded from: respondent’s sex: (male=1, female=0) 
BLACK  Recoded from: What race do you consider yourself? (Black=1, else=0) 
ORACE  Recoded from What race do you consider yourself? (Other race=1, else=0) 
CATHOLIC  Recoded from: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? (Catholic=1, else=0) 
JEWISH  Recoded from: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? (Jewish=1, else=0) 
ORELIG  Recoded from: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? (Other Religion=1, else=0) 
NRELIG  Recoded from: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other 
religion, or no religion? (No Religion=1, else=0) 
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Appendix B. Nonrecursive Models 
 
With nonrecursive models, the confidence that can be placed in the results depends on the 
choice of instruments. The instrument offered for psychism is déjà vu. Both psychism and déjà 
vu can be seen as “intrusions” or “glitches” in the functioning of the mind, and they are 
correlated at  =.32, but the consequences of interpretations for each are quite different. Aside 
from fictional accounts or reincarnation, there is little to suggest that anyone interprets the 
psychic intrusions defined as déjà vu as anything other than an unusual or amusing experience, 
so these do affect target beliefs or behaviors.  On the other hand, intrusions defined as psychism 
are interpreted as messages from the spirit world that have accompanying moral imperatives 
(like experiences of the holy, see Otto, 1952), or as “proof” of extrasensory perceptions or other 
esoteric beliefs. The use of déjà vu effectively measures how much of the effect of intrusions on 
the target is attributable to the supernatural interpretation.  
A single instrumental variable that can be used for all target beliefs and practices is the 
perception of the Bible as the literal word of God, as inspired by God, or as a book of fables and 
moral precepts. This can be seen as a measure of Hunter’s (1991) orthodoxy, theorized as the 
most important cross-denominational influence of religion in America – the perception of an 
absolute instead of a culturally relative basis for moral authority. While one might theorize that 
spiritual experiences can validate a literal interpretation, three measures of psychism – ESP, 
clairvoyance, communication with the dead – can be interpreted as pure intrusions with little 
reference to religion. Even the last measure, being “close to a powerful spiritual force” does not 
necessarily relate to Biblical literalism. Using orthodoxy as an instrument for the religious beliefs 
essentially measures how much of the effect of orthodoxy on the frequency of psychism is due to 
the religious belief or practice – which as predicted is negligible.  
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One important difference between the proposed model and more typical nonrecursive models 
is that the instrument for psychism is correlated with instead of a causal factor for psychism. This 
is an acceptable option discussed by Heise (1975:160) but is rarely offered in standard statistical 
programs that have modules for nonrecursive analysis such as two stages least squares (2SLS). 
The correlated model is derived from psychism theory’s assertion that both psychism and déjà vu 
are the result of intrusions, while the standard model might be interpreted as using déjà vu as a 
measure for the intrusions themselves. AMOS 4.01, the statistical package used in this analysis 
that modeled the correlated instrument used the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
estimation procedure, but that method assumes multivariate normality, and a quick check of the 
distribution for psychism showed that it was highly skewed. To verify the results, a program was 
written to properly residualize the instruments so that SPSS’s 2SLS procedure, which does not 
assume multivariate normality, could approximate the correct model. Results from that model 
were essentially identical to those reported using the FIML model, demonstrating that the 
skewed distribution for psychism was not a problem and that the results were not a quirk of 
specifying the instrumental variable as correlated with – instead of a determinant of – psychism. 
One possible objection to this model as a test for conformity theory is that, with two 
measures that have no direct religious implication (ESP and VISIONS), psychism may not be a 
good measure for “spiritual experience” as conceived in conformity theory. This objection was 
met by estimating all models using an alternate measure of psychism that was constructed from 
the two measures that had the clearest religious implications: SPIRITS, communication with the 
dead, and GRACE, contact with a spiritual force. The substantive results were the same.   
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Appendix C. Details of Analysis 
Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) offer several statistics to test the suitability of composite scales 
over measurement models. With the GSS data, their invalidity statistic for psychism (=.0002) 
verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic (TS=.84) shows a high correlation 
between the scale and the underlying factor, and along with their reliability statistic (= .70), the 
use of the composite scale instead of the measurement model is supported. Weights for the 
measures of psychism are the path s obtained from a confirmatory factor analysis, where 
esp=.624, visions= .407, spirits=.604, and grace=.403. This was conducted using AMOS 4.01. The 
model fit statistics were 2 =.44, with 2 degrees of freedom giving a probability of fitting the 
data at p=.80. This procedure is used for all scales in this study.  
Detailed results for all models are reported in Table C. The religious identity scale is 
constructed using confidence in the existence of God and degree which faith is free of doubt. As 
with all scales using two measures, the s are weighted at 1.The Heise-Bohrnstedt reliability 
statistic (= .60) and validity statistic (TS=.77) offer acceptable support for using the composite 
scale. Substantive results are the same if the two measures are tested individually. The two 
measures of social interaction with God, closeness to God and anger at God, were modeled 
separately because they produced Heise-Bohrnstedt reliability (= .22) and validity (TS=.47) 
statistics that are too low to support using these as a scale.  
 The conformity scale is composed of three questions measuring the importance of church 
teachings to make decisions, the importance of believing in God without doubt, and the 
importance of following church teachings. Weights were obtained from a measurement model, 
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where church decisions=.912, belief=.824, and follow teachings=1.091. The Heise-Bohrnstedt statistics 
(=.0001, TS=.88, = .78) support the use of the scale.  
 The communal practices scale is composed of three questions measuring the frequency of 
church or synagogue attendance, the log of the annual contributions to religious organizations, 
and the church or synagogue membership status. Weights were obtained from a measurement 
model, where attendance=2.343, contributions=3.735, and membership=.302. The Heise-Bohrnstedt 
statistics (=.0001, TS=.86, = .74) support the use of the composite scale.  
 Two questions that measure moral autonomy, following one’s own conscience and morality 
as a personal matter, have too low reliability (= .30) and validity (TS=.51) to be scaled, so 
they are tested separately.  
 Finally, two measure of spiritual practices that can reasonably be considered private practices 
are the frequency of prayer and the frequency of reading the Bible. The Heise-Bohrnstedt 
statistics (=.0006, TS=.83, = .69) support the use of the composite scale, where each 
measure  is weighted at 1. 
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Table C-1. Standardized Coefficients from Nonrecursive Models of Psychism and Religious Beliefs and 
Practices using Standard Social Controls. 
 Model 1 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 
Dependent 
 Independent   psychism 
identity 
beliefs psychism 
closeness to 
God psychism mad at God 
Married (=1) 0.01  0.06  0.02  0.08 * 0.01  0.03   
  (0.30 ) (1.53 ) (0.32 ) (2.06 ) (0.16 ) (0.76 )  
Widow (=1) 0.04  -0.03  0.05  -0.01   0.04  0.06   
  (1.04 ) (-0.76 ) (1.06 ) (-0.16 )  (0.72 ) (1.36 )  
Separated (=1) 0.03  0.00  0.03  0.02   0.02  0.02   
  (0.79 ) (-0.12 ) (0.81 ) (0.60 )  (0.64 ) (0.72 )  
Divorced (=1) 0.13 ** 0.02   0.13 ** -0.01   0.13 ** 0.01   
  (3.67 ) (0.61 ) (3.65 ) (-0.14 )  (3.33 ) (0.23 )  
Age of Respondent -0.01  0.06  0.00  0.09 ** 0.02  -0.16 ** 
  (-0.13 ) (1.93 ) (-0.08 ) (2.58 )  (0.19 ) (-4.43 )  
Education (year) 0.00  -0.01   0.00  0.00   -0.01  0.04   
  (-0.02 ) (-0.39 ) (-0.02 ) (0.00 )  (-0.15 ) (1.26 )  
Family Income (scaled)  -0.09 * 0.01   -0.09 * -0.06   -0.08 * 0.01   
  (-2.42 ) (0.35 ) (-2.33 ) (-2.01 )  (-2.43 ) (0.31 )  
Male (=1) -0.10 ** -0.05   -0.10 ** -0.11 ** -0.09  -0.07 * 
  (-3.22 ) (-1.73 ) (-2.88 ) (-3.78 )  (-1.78 ) (-2.28 )  
Black (=1) 0.05  0.08 ** 0.06  0.07 * 0.07  -0.11 ** 
  (1.70 ) (2.85 ) (1.67 ) (2.48 )  (1.18 ) (-3.47 )  
Other Race (=1) -0.02  0.04   -0.03  0.00   -0.02  -0.01   
  (-0.78 ) (1.49 ) (-0.84 ) (-0.17 )  (-0.72 ) (-0.47 )  
Catholic (=1) 0.01  0.00   0.01  0.04   0.00  0.07 * 
  (0.39 ) (0.01 ) (0.44 ) (1.33 )  (0.05 ) (2.21 )  
Jewish (=1) -0.01  -0.10 ** -0.01  -0.07 ** -0.02  0.06 * 
  (-0.33 ) (-3.49 ) (-0.33 ) (-2.69 )  (-0.38 ) (2.05 )  
Other Religion (=1) 0.05  0.05   0.05  0.02   0.05  -0.04   
  (1.63 ) (1.71 ) (1.61 ) (0.61 )  (1.60 ) (-1.44 )  
No Religion (=1) -0.03  -0.17 ** -0.03  -0.19 ** -0.03  0.07 * 
  (-0.69 ) (-5.88 ) (-0.65 ) (-6.89 )  (-0.64 ) (2.16 )  
Orthodoxy   0.35 **   0.25 **   -0.07 * 
   (12.12 )   (8.51 )    (-2.15 )  
Déjà vu correlation 0.32 **    0.33 **    0.32 **    
  (10.93 )    (10.39 )    (8.45 )    
Error correlation (-t) 0.11     -0.01     -0.23     
  (0.95 )    (-0.08 )    (-0.51 )    
Target/Psychism -0.03  0.00   -0.04  0.23 †† 0.14  0.16 † 
  (-0.29 ) (0.01 )  (-0.29 ) (3.01 ) (0.30 ) (1.82 )  
R-squared 0.05  0.23   0.03  0.24   0.05  0.06   
Stability Index   0.000     0.009     0.021   
Chronbach’s  0.68  0.61   0.68     0.68      
H-B reliability  0.70  0.60   0.70     0.70     
H-B validity TS 0.84  0.77   0.84     0.84     
H-B invalidity  0.00  0.00   0.00     0.00     
* p<.05  ** p<.01  two-tailed tests   † p<.05  †† p<.01  one-tailed tests   () denote t-scores 
N=1128 
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Table C-2. Standardized Coefficients from Nonrecursive Models of Psychism and Religious Beliefs and 
Practices using Standard Social Controls. 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5-1 
Dependent 
 Independent    psychism 
conformist 
beliefs psychism 
communal 
practices psychism 
morality is  
personal 
Married (=1) 0.01  0.07   0.02  0.18 ** 0.01  -0.01   
  (0.30 ) (1.86 )  (0.37 ) (4.38 )  (0.28 ) (-0.15 )  
Widow (=1) 0.04  0.01   0.05  0.08   0.05  -0.01   
  (1.06 ) (0.27 )  (1.09 ) (1.92 )  (1.08 ) (-0.31 )  
Separated (=1) 0.02  -0.01   0.02  0.00   0.02  0.01   
  (0.78 ) (-0.28 )  (0.78 ) (-0.11 )  (0.76 ) (0.29 )  
Divorced (=1) 0.13 ** 0.03   0.13 ** 0.00   0.13 ** 0.02   
  (3.66 ) (0.85 )  (3.56 ) (-0.11 )  (3.32 ) (0.62 )  
Age of Respondent -0.01  0.07 * 0.00  0.18 ** 0.00  -0.10 ** 
  (-0.12 ) (2.02 )  (0.04 ) (5.33 )  (0.07 ) (-2.67 )  
Education (year) 0.00  -0.08 ** 0.01  0.17 ** 0.01  -0.09 ** 
  (-0.07 ) (-2.66 )  (0.18 ) (5.29 )  (0.21 ) (-2.65 )  
Family Income (scaled)  -0.09 * -0.12 ** -0.08 * 0.08 * -0.08 * -0.05   
  (-2.38 ) (-3.56 )  (-2.18 ) (2.32 )  (-2.02 ) (-1.42 )  
Male (=1) -0.10 ** -0.05   -0.10 ** -0.07 * -0.10 ** 0.06   
  (-3.25 ) (-1.73 )  (-3.19 ) (-2.52 )  (-3.01 ) (1.82 )  
Black (=1) 0.05  0.08 ** 0.06  0.11 ** 0.05  0.00   
  (1.71 ) (2.69 )  (1.64 ) (3.87 )  (1.68 ) (-0.07 )  
Other Race (=1) -0.02  0.02   -0.03  -0.01   -0.02  0.00   
  (-0.80 ) (0.68 )  (-0.84 ) (-0.50 )  (-0.83 ) (0.03 )  
Catholic (=1) 0.01  0.01   0.01  0.06  0.01  0.01   
  (0.40 ) (0.41 )  (0.47 ) (1.90 )  (0.34 ) (0.32 )  
Jewish (=1) -0.01  -0.04   -0.01  -0.01   -0.01  0.03   
  (-0.30 ) (-1.30 )  (-0.28 ) (-0.39 )  (-0.34 ) (1.05 )  
Other Religion (=1) 0.05  0.02   0.05  -0.04   0.05  0.01   
  (1.58 ) (0.61 )  (1.40 ) (-1.44 )  (1.51 ) (0.18 )  
No Religion (=1) -0.03  -0.23 ** -0.03  -0.26 ** -0.03  0.06   
  (-0.67 ) (-8.17 ) (-0.60 ) (-8.86 ) (-0.69 ) (1.82 )  
Orthodoxy   0.36 **   0.21 **   -0.09 ** 
   (12.22 )    (7.01 )    (-2.93 )  
Déjà vu correlation 0.32 **    0.32 **    0.32 **    
  (10.53 )    (9.75 )    (9.56 )    
Error correlation (-t) 0.35 **    0.37 *    -0.14     
  (3.22 )    (2.45 )    (-0.39 )    
Target/Psychism -0.03  -0.26 †† -0.05  -0.29 †† 0.10  0.15 † 
  (-0.29 ) (-3.37 )  (-0.29 ) (-3.61 )  (0.30 ) (1.70 )  
R-squared 0.05  0.22   0.05  0.18   0.06  0.05   
Stability Index   0.007     0.013     0.015   
Chronbach’s  0.68  0.76  0.68  0.80  0.70     
H-B reliability  0.70  0.78  0.70  0.74  0.70     
H-B validity TS 0.84  0.88  0.84  0.86  0.84     
H-B invalidity  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00     
* p<.05  ** p<.01  two-tailed tests   † p<.05  †† p<.01  one-tailed tests   () denote t-scores 
N=1128 
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Table C-3. Standardized Coefficients from Nonrecursive Models of Psychism and Religious Beliefs and 
Practices using Standard Social Controls. 
 Model 5-2 Model 6     
Dependent 
 Independent     psychism 
follow  own 
conscience psychism 
private 
practices      
Married (=1) 0.01  -0.01   0.02  0.10 *      
  (0.28 ) (-0.22 )  (0.33 ) (2.75 )       
Widow (=1) 0.05  -0.03   0.05  0.04        
  (1.09 ) (-0.81 )  (1.08 ) (1.02 )       
Separated (=1) 0.02  0.03   0.03  0.03        
  (0.66 ) (0.94 )  (0.82 ) (1.20 )       
Divorced (=1) 0.13 ** 0.00   0.13 ** 0.01        
  (3.50 ) (-0.01 )  (3.66 ) (0.39 )       
Age of Respondent -0.01  0.08 * 0.00  0.18 **      
  (-0.31 ) (2.19 )  (0.01 ) (5.62 )       
Education (year) -0.01  0.06   0.00  0.08 **      
  (-0.14 ) (1.67 )  (0.07 ) (2.56 )       
Family Income (scaled)  -0.09 * 0.04   -0.09 * -0.11 **      
  (-2.42 ) (0.99 )  (-2.23 ) (-3.71 )       
Male (=1) -0.09 ** -0.03   -0.10 ** -0.13 **      
  (-2.79 ) (-0.96 )  (-2.80 ) (-4.88 )       
Black (=1) 0.06  -0.07 * 0.06  0.08 **      
  (1.57 ) (-2.35 )  (1.66 ) (3.16 )       
Other Race (=1) -0.03  0.07 * -0.03  -0.07 **      
  (-0.87 ) (2.24 )  (-0.88 ) (-2.67 )       
Catholic (=1) 0.01  0.02   0.01  -0.12 **      
  (0.32 ) (0.46 )  (0.20 ) (-4.59 )       
Jewish (=1) -0.01  0.02   -0.01  -0.12 **      
  (-0.31 ) (0.60 )  (-0.36 ) (-4.72 )       
Other Religion (=1) 0.05  -0.02   0.05  -0.03        
  (1.62 ) (-0.66 )  (1.51 ) (-1.21 )       
No Religion (=1) -0.03  0.05   -0.03  -0.19 **      
  (-0.70 ) (1.55 )  (-0.65 ) (-7.16 )       
Orthodoxy   -0.10 **   0.24 **     
   (-3.10 )    (8.80 )      
Déjà vu correlation 0.32 **    0.33 **         
  (8.63 )    (10.69 )         
Error correlation (-t) -0.25     0.01          
  (-0.78 )    (0.09 )         
Target/Psychism 0.09  0.22 †† -0.04  0.15 †      
  (0.30 ) (2.49 )  (-0.29 ) (2.08 )       
R-squared 0.05  0.02   0.04  0.31        
Stability Index   0.020     0.006        
Chronbach’s  0.70    0.70  0.69           
H-B reliability  0.70    0.70  0.69        
H-B validity TS 0.84    0.84  0.83        
H-B invalidity  0.00    0.00  0.00        
* p<.05  ** p<.01  two-tailed tests   † p<.05  †† p<.01  one-tailed tests   () denote t-scores 
N=1128 
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